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ISEG (School of Economics and Management)
Technical University of Lisbon (TULisbon)
Rua do Quelhas, 6 1200-781 Lisboa Portugal
Research Unit on Complexity in Economics (UECE) †
December 15, 2009
Abstract
Positional behavior is a source of externalities and sets limits to
wellbeing. Remedies against this market failure are defended by some
authors and rejected by others, while the core of the discussion rests on
the benefits and costs of applying economic instruments. One of the
issues discussed is the role that the competition for positional goods
may have in generating technological innovation.
This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of this process
by analyzing an agent-based model. We observe a plausible structure
of the dynamics behind the process of generation of technological inno-
vation by positional consumption and obtain results on the influence
of some key factors on the pace of innovation, particularly those of
income inequality, the Hirsch conjecture of relative increase of posi-
tional consumption with affluence, and consumer network and social
neighborhood sizes.
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1 Introduction
The positional economy refers to all those goods, services, occupations, or
other social relations that are either scarce in an absolute or socially im-
posed sense, or subject to crowding or congestion through more extensive
use. The concept was introduced by Fred Hirsch (1976) in the book ”So-
cial Limits to Growth”. The idea of a positional economy differs from the
classical material economy, in which the utility enjoyed with material goods
is independent of other individuals’ choices. In the material economy, the
possibilities to increase the utility of members of society can ultimately be
considered limitless, as long as the consumption of additional goods pro-
vides any marginal utility to individuals. In opposition, utility gathered in
the positional economy depends on the scarcity of the items consumed, a
scarcity imposed either physically or socially. With positional consumption,
one’s utility depends directly on the way other individuals consume the same
product. The consumption of status goods is the most eminent case of the po-
sitional consumption. The scarcer and most difficult to obtain are the status
goods, services or occupations, the more utility they give to the consumer.
Hirsch identifies negative consequences to wellbeing by the positional
economy, because the satisfaction of one individual implies the loss of sat-
isfaction by other individuals. In the realm of the consumption of status
goods, the nature of the purposes of individuals leads them to a competition
over positional goods. However, by definition the net utility provided by
status consumption is socially limited, because status is a relative concept;
any increase in satisfaction of an individual is formed at the expense of a
correspondent decrease in the satisfaction of others. This competition thus
results in a zero-sum game and status consumption can consequently be re-
garded as resource wasteful, since individuals as a whole expend efforts with
no aggregate return for the economy.
The description of a useless competitive quest for consumer goods of social
significance had been clearly introduced previously by several other authors.
Most prominently, Veblen (1899) described the negative aspects and strongly
criticized the phenomenon conspicuous consumption and leisure. Galbraith
(1958) described what he called the ”dependence effect” between wants cre-
ation and the process by which they are satisfied, presuming a process po-
sitional competition. Easterlin’s (1974, 1994) empirical work suggests that
increasing the average income of a society does not increase its happiness
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level, a result upon which he asserts that ”material norms on which judg-
ments of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual
income of the society”. Several other authors covered this subject before
Hirsch, but it never got into the first line of the economics research agenda.
After his observations of positional consumption and economic affluence,
Hirsch argued that the inefficiencies to wellbeing caused by positional con-
sumption increases with economic growth: ”as the level of average consump-
tion rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on a social as well as
an individual aspect. That is to say, the satisfaction that individuals derive
from goods and services depends in increasing measure not only on their own
consumption but on consumption by others as well”. This presumably hap-
pens because, as the economy grows, and with it consumer incomes, a higher
share of spending can increasingly be applied in uses other than the basic
material needs such as food and habitation. As a consequence, the relative
importance of the positional economy over the material economy increases
as affluence grows, thereby imposing ”social limits to growth”.
Hirsch’s conjecture originated one of the debates on the origin, conse-
quences and possible remedies of the positional economy. Is indeed the quest
for positional goods gaining eminence as the economy grows, thereby increas-
ing inefficiency? Are there benefits from the positional economy offsetting its
damage? Should policymakers regard this issue as a matter of state interven-
tion? Hirsch himself assumed a prudent position on policy remedies against
it. His prudence was justified by the lack of knowledge of the costs and ben-
efits of applying such kind of policies, although he provided enlightenment
on the issues.
The most eminent claim for policy actions for the recoil of the positional
economy came from Robert Frank. Frank (1999, 2003, 2005) compares the
competition for positionality e.g. with an arms race between two countries,
where mutual escalation of expenditure on armaments driven by fear for po-
litical independence, does not enhance security for either nation. The overall
effect is a reduced welfare, for the extra spending comes at the expense of
domestic consumption. Positional consumption should therefore be faced as
an externality, in the sense that positional climbing from an agent increases
the effort of other agents needed to maintain their own positions. Frank
argues that the State should intervene and as a policy remedy he advo-
cates progressive consumption taxes. Progressive consumption taxes would
discourage high-end consumption and consequently erode the ”expenditure
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cascade” that follows.
Critics of Frank generally do not question that positional consumption is
a market failure (Frank, 2006). However several do question that it should
be a matter of state intervention. Kashdan and Klein (2006) present a set of
arguments against taxation on positional consumption, arguing that Frank
”overstates the problem, overlooks various voluntary solutions, overlooks un-
intended consequences of using taxation, and neglects the Smithian incum-
bency on those proposing coercion” .
One of the arguably unintended consequences of positional taxation is
that it will reduce the positive effect of positional consumption in its role as
a driver of technological innovation. Cited by Kashdan and Klein, Hayek has
stated the importance of high-end consumption to innovation: ”What today
may seem extravagance or even waste, because it is enjoyed by the few and
even undreamed of by the masses, is payment for the experimentation with a
style of living that will eventually be available to many” (Hayek 1960). In this
respect Kashdan and Klein add that ”in the dynamics of a growing economy,
the wealthy provide a market for goods that must be expensive in order to
supply to be viable. The wealthy pay extra to enjoy the benefits of new goods,
which, if suitable to human existence, will later become inexpensive and
widely adopted”. To internalize the costs of the competition for positional
goods would therefore cease the positive externalities of this mechanism to
innovation.
In reply to Kashdan and Klein, Frank (2006) countered this argument by
stating that the alternative capital allocation caused by positional taxation
would also drive technological innovation. In the short run, Frank argues,
”the tax would not change the total level of spending. Rather, it would
shift the composition of spending in favor of investment”, which would drive
capital goods innovation. Frank additionally argues that the higher rates of
investment would, in the long run, cause consumption level to increase in
relation to the low-savings trajectory through income growth.
Several and complex matters interfere with the way positional consump-
tion may or may not generate socially desirable technological innovation, and
how far. An objective evaluation of the extent to which positional consump-
tion generates a process of technological innovation seems unattainable on
practical grounds. However, at a theoretical level we could at least envisage
a better understanding of the issues at stake.
In this paper we aim to achieve a better comprehension of the dynamics
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of the process of generation of technological innovation through positional
consumption. In that view, we build an agent-based model which stands for
the generation of technological innovation by the competition for positional
goods. The results of its simulation allow to observe in detail the dynamics
of this process. Besides it, we observe the influence of some relevant factors
on the pace of innovation. These factors are, namely, the level of income in-
equality of the consumer society, the materialization of the Hirsch conjecture
and the size and structure of the network of positional consumers.
2 Is positional consumption an effective way
of generating technological innovation?
Frank’s (2006) point on the role of alternative capital allocations to positional
consumption towards technological innovation shows that, even accepting
that positional competition has a positive effect over innovation, there are
no a priori reasons to believe that positional taxation reduces innovation be-
cause the increase in investment capital allocation generated also has positive
effects over innovation in the short run and even more so in the long run.
Whether the outcome of positive effects over innovation is better in the
short run in a laissez faire or a taxed positional economy, depends simply
on either it is the first or the second case that directly generates the highest
innovation. In the long run the answer is less straightforward, depending
also on the dynamical effects of innovation and investment. If, in the short
run, innovation is higher in the positional taxation scenario, it is clear that
it will also be higher in the long run. However, if the laissez faire scenario
produces higher short run innovation, both outcomes would still be possible
in the long run depending on whether the additional short run innovation
of the laissez faire scenario would generate enough income growth to offset
the income growth driven by additional investment in the positional taxation
scenario.
In order to respond to the question of wether it is more beneficial to the
development of technological innovation to have it being generated through
positional consumption or through other means of capital allocation, it would
be necessary to objectively assess benefits over innovation of both alterna-
tives. Focusing on the positional competition alternative, one would in this
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regard aim to assess wether or not its process generates technological inno-
vation and, if so, in what extent.
The answer certainly depends largely on what the particular object of
positional competition is, and on which attribute of the good is valued for
status. For example if the positional good in question is the automobile, and
its positional attribute is solely its brand name, then the associated positional
behavior will not generate technological innovation. It will instead plausibly
cause prices to be maintained at a high level to promote the top status of
the brand thanks to the limited number of consumers who can afford such
a car. On the contrary, if the positional attribute of the car is its driving
performance, or its comfort, then positional competition should be a source
of technological innovation directed at that positional attribute.
Another issue is that of the benefits of the type of innovation in question
to society. Even if positional consumption does produce technological inno-
vation, such innovation can only be regarded as positive for wellbeing in the
extent to which it is able to address material needs, in addition to positional
needs, for only the satisfaction of the former need is susceptible to increase
wellbeing. For example, if we assume that the odor of a perfume solely sat-
isfies positional needs, then technological innovation directed at improving
the smell of perfumes can not increase wellbeing because the additional sat-
isfaction of one’s needs (of smelling good, in relation to others) motivated by
innovations in the chemistry of the substance is done at the expense of the
satisfaction of the remaining.
In view of these matters, the question of whether positional consumption
is an effective process of generating technological innovation should be broken
down into three questions:
- Does positional consumption contribute to the generation of any tech-
nological innovation?
- If so, in what measure?
- And finally, is the generated technological innovation welfare enhancing
(i.e. does it address material needs)?
In this paper we focus on the comprehension of the process by which
technological innovation is generated by competition for positional goods.
With that aim, a representative model of the process is used which tries to
characterize the process and conditions determining the pace of innovation.
We are therefore focusing mainly on the second issue, i.e. the intensity of
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technological innovation generated. The condition of the first question above
as taken as true - i.e. the type of good considered is one over which there is
a positional competition directed at an attribute susceptible of technological
innovation - whereas the issue of effects on welfare is not covered here.
To analyze the level of technological innovation generated, the model
includes several factors which affect the pace of innovation. The factors
analyzed are income inequality, the occurrence of the Hirsch conjecture and
the size and nature of the network of positional consumers.
3 A Model of Positional Consumption and
Technological Innovation
An agent-based modelling (ABM) approach seems to be most appropriate
choice for modeling the relation between positional consumption and tech-
nological innovation, due to the fundamental role that interactions between
agents (consumers and firms) have in the development of the process. Axel-
rod and Tesfatsion (2005) remark that ”when the interaction of the agents
is contingent on past experience, and especially when the agents continually
adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in
its ability to derive the dynamic consequences. In this case, ABM might
be the only practical method of analysis”. The process of technological in-
novation generated by positional consumption corresponds to this area of
problems. In fact, unlike for classical material consumption, when positional
consumers evaluate the expected utility from the acquisition of a given good,
they do it by observing the distribution of goods possessed by all the other
consumers in their relevant social network. Therefore the evolution of their
decisions is fully interdependent with past decisions of other agents. A feed-
back loop occurs in this chain of events, whereby a decision of a consumer
is determined by the decisions of the remaining consumers, which are later
influenced by that same decision. The same goes for the decisions of firms to
engage in the creation of new, more technologically advanced goods. Such
decisions depend on their expectations on future revenues produced by the
new goods, and therefore by the distributional structure of goods possessed
by the consumers in the social network(s), which is on its side also contingent
on the possible previous creation of new goods. In short, the nature of the
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process is characterized by the existence of interacting agents, by the contin-
gency of their decisions on past decisions and by the existence of feedback
loops, all elements that make a mathematical approach difficult to realize.
Our agent-based model intends to represent the process of interaction
between positional consumption of status goods and the possible generation
of technological innovation through the creation of more advanced goods. For
such it is designed to contain the most elementary features of both positional
consumption and the development of innovative goods as a function of the
consumers’ willingness to pay. The focus is therefore mainly on representing
(i) a consumer valuation of goods based on status grounds (utility depends
on other consumers’ choices), (ii) the behavior of firms over technological
innovation contingent on expected revenues, and also (iii) the consideration
of a progressive price decrease of existing goods due to increasing competition
between firms and production process efficiency. The designed model aimed
to contain these features in a simple form. A detailed description follows.
The model is characterized by the following agents:
- C consumers, characterized by different levels of income;
- The industry, which is a single agent representing the aggregate behavior
of firms in the economy;
The fundamental structural assumptions of the model are described
below:
- There is one type of good, with a technological attribute that provides
consumers with status;
- Consumers aim to maximize individual utility; utility is obtained through
status;
- There is a G number of versions of that type of good1, each being
characterized by having different levels of technological development;
- The utility provided by a good to a consumer depends on the technolog-
ical level of the good and on the choices of the other consumers; the higher
is the technological hierarchy and the least consumers have that version or
superior versions of the good, the higher is the positional utility conferred by
the good;
1Versions of the good under study are further simply designated as goods.
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- The utility obtained in each simulation period is valid for that period
only; consumers buy a good in each simulation period to obtain utility for
that period;
- The budget of the consumer for buying a good in each period is deter-
mined by his income;
- Consumers’ choices depend on the expected utilities provided by the
goods, their prices and the available incomes of consumers; consumers have
different willingness to pay for utility depending on their incomes.
- The industry can create a technologically more advanced good; to do
that it must incur in research & development (R&D) for its development; a
technologically more advanced version is created if the expected demand for
the new version is able to exceed the R&D costs necessary for its development;
- When a new good is created, the industry sets its price at the level that
maximizes revenues from sales, taking into account the number of consumers
that would buy the good at each possible price;
- The price of the existent versions of the good decrease with time due to
increasing competition of supply and production process efficiency.
Figure 1 describes the sequence of steps of the model run. It consists of a
cyclical sequence in which consumers observe the choices of other consumers,
form expectations of the utility derived from each possible version of the
good and decide which good to buy. Then the industry evaluates the possible
advantage of developing a technologically more advanced good and decides
whether or not to create the good. Finally, the prices of goods are updated
and the following period starts.
The formal specification of the model setup is described in the following
sections.
Consumer Network
A consumer is influenced by a set of consumers, in his preferences over
positional goods. The model is built on a network in which each consumer
is influenced by a group of other consumers, in line with Frank and Levine’s
(2007) description of the interactions affecting consumer preferences over
positional goods.
The social classes are defined in the model by income levels. The neigh-
borhood N(i) of a consumer i consists of the set of his Ns closest individuals
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Figure 1: Model structure
in the income ranking 2, being Ns the size of the neighborhood. The formal
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where Np(i) is the pseudo-neighborhood of i and is given by:
Np(i) := {j ∈ I : |i− j| ≤ Ns2 } (2)
2For the purposes of this paper, a Ranking characterizes the hierarchical order of sub-
jects before a given attribute. The ranking is a sequence of integers between one (1) and
the number of subjects characterized by the ranking (C). Rankings are attributed by
decreasing order of the attribute values of subjects. In this case, the subjects are the
consumers and the attribute in their income.
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Figure 2: Examples of neighborhood in a network of 10 consumers with a
neighborhood size of 4
where I is the set of consumers.
As stated in equation 1, the neighborhood of each consumer depends on
his relative position on the income ranking. All consumers have the same
number of neighbors, therefore low-end and high-end consumers have an
asymmetric neighborhood with more neighbors on one side of the income
ranking than the other side, due to finiteness of the set of consumers. This
definition implies that connections are unidirectional, i.e. where a consumer
is influenced by the choices of another consumer the opposite may not nec-
essarily happen. Figure 2 illustrates examples of consumer neighborhoods.
Consumer Incomes
Consumers have different levels of income, which increase with the index
i representing individuals. Consumer incomes (W ) follow a Weibull distri-
bution curve, with a cumulative form given by:
F (W (i), W̄ , k) = 1− exp(−(W (i)
W
)k) (3)
with W (i) ≥ 0 and W being the average income.
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The Weibull curve allows to represent various configurations for the distri-
butions of incomes, ranging from unequal to even distributions. The degree
of (in)equality of the distribution depends on the constant k. The following
Figure represents three possible curve profiles, depending on k:
Figure 3: Possible profiles for income distributions characterized by a Weibull
distribution
Consumers are willing to spend up to a fraction qp of their income in posi-
tional functionalities. Fraction qp would be actually spent by the consumer in
the positional functionality if the good purchasable with that amount would
allow him to reach the maximum possible utility derived from the positional
functionality. This assumption is described in further detail below.
Prices of Goods
Each good g has a price P (g). The prices of goods decrease with time
due to increasing competition of supply and production process efficiency.
Prices of goods evolve according to a negative exponential given by:
P (k) = Pcomp + (Plaunch(g)− Pcomp). exp(− t−t0(g)kp ) (4)
where Pcomp is the competitive market price - i.e. the price when there is full
competition for the commercialization of the good and production efficient
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is maximized (in the long term) - Plaunch(g) is the price of a good g set by
the industry in the period of its launch in the market, t is the present time,
t0(g) is the period of creation of good g and kp is a constant that determines
how slow the price decreases3.
Utilities
The positional utility provided by a good depends on: how high that
good is positioned in the technological hierarchy, and; on the hierarchies of
the goods possessed by the other consumers. The value of the maximum
achievable utility is one (1) and occurs if the consumer possesses the higher
good in the technological hierarchy and no other consumers possess the same
good. The minimum possible utility is zero (0) and occurs if all the remaining
consumers possess goods of higher hierarchy than that of the individual. The








where Ninf (i, g) is the number of neighbors in the social influence network
(neighborhood) of individual i who buy technologically inferior goods than
g and Neq(i, g) is the number of consumers in the social influence network of
the individual i who buys equivalent goods (i.e. good g itself).
In words, having a superior good than that of another consumer within
the influence neighborhood provides twice the positional utility of having the
same good as another consumer, while having an inferior good does not give
any positional utility.
The utility provided by the good only lasts for the period of its acquisition,
expiring at the beginning of the following period. Therefore the consumers
have to buy a new good in a period to achieve any utility at that period.
Finally, it is implicitly assumed that material utility does not influence
the choices of consumers; either the goods provide no material utility or they
all provide the same.
Consumer choices
The consumer’s choice of a good in each period depends on his willingness
to pay for utility, which is a function of his income. In each period, the
3kp=20 in all simulations below.
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consumer chooses the good with the better trade-off between price and utility.
It is assumed that consumers do not downgrade their previous choices, i.e.
they do not consider buying a given good if they have previously bought a
more technologically developed one at some point in time.
The model assumes that, for taking a decision, the consumer compares
pairs of goods. In each comparison, his preference is determined by the
differences of potential utilities provided by the goods being compared and
by his willingness to pay for utility. When comparing between goods gm and
gn, the consumer chooses gm if the difference in utilities between gm and gn
is higher than the ratio between their difference in prices and the consumer’s
maximum budget assignable to the positional functionality. Formally, the
choice falls on gm over gn if the following condition is met:
U(gm)− U(gn) ≥ P (gm)−P (gn)W (i)∗qp (6)
The consumer is willing to give a proportion qp of his income in return
for Umax=1, therefore his willingness to pay for utility is W (i) ∗ qp.
An assumption of the model is that consumers base their decisions on
expected utilities, which are formed under the supposition that all other
consumers maintain the options made in the previous period.
Innovation: creation of new goods
Technological innovation is reflected in this model by the creation of new,
technologically more advanced goods. The more goods are created during
the simulation time, the more investment in innovation happens.
In each period, a new and technologically more advanced good may be
created by the industry. For that to happen, the industry must invest a given
amount in R&D (Crd). A new good is developed if the potential revenue
(Rpot) derived by its hypothetical sales in the following period is higher than
the R&D costs that would be involved in its creation:
Rpot > Crd (7)
The cost of R&D efforts necessary to create the new good is given as a
ratio f of the total income of consumers in the economy (Wtotal). Fixing R&D
costs in terms of total income allows us to test effects of income distribution.
Crd = Wtotal ∗ f (8)
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The potential revenue from a hypothetical new good is calculated on
the basis of the price that would maximize the difference between revenues
obtained from its sales and those obtained if the good would not be created,
considering the number of consumers that would be willing to buy the good
at that price:
Rpot = maxi{(Pmax(i, gnew)− P (ghigh)) ∗ (C − i + 1)}, i ∈ H (9)
where gnew is the hypothetical new good, ghigh is the present good with
the highest ranking, H is the group of consumers which consumed ghigh and
Pmax(i, gnew) is the maximum price that the consumer i would be willing to
offer for the newly more advanced good, with:
Pmax(i, gnew) = P (ghigh) + (U(gnew)− U(ghigh)) ∗W (i) ∗ qp (10)
4 Results
4.1 Scenarios
The model was aimed at the comprehension of the process of technological
innovation through the competition for positional goods. Its simulation al-
lowed us to observe the structure of dynamics behind positionality driven
innovation, as well as testing the influence of relevant factors towards the
pace of innovation, particularly:
- Income inequality (k); as described above, income inequality has
been pointed out by prominent authors as a factor that promotes the market
generation of technological innovation, and is consequently pointed as an ar-
gument against the application of instruments aimed at recoiling the process
of competition for positional goods like the progressive consumption tax.
- Proportion of income allocatable to positional consumption
(qp); testing this factor corresponds to testing the effects of the material-
ization of the the Hirsch conjecture, of growing positional relative spending
with wealth increase.
- Size and type of consumer network (c); it is interesting, from the
social network analysis perspective, to observe the effects over technological
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innovation that may arise from different sizes of the population of consumers
and the extension of social influence through social classes.
The set of simulations realized was formed by a baseline simulation, and
further sets of simulations aimed at studying the influence of factors outlined
here. The term innovation, or pace of innovation, refers here to the total
number of new goods created during the simulation time.
Table 1: Model inputs
In the tested set of simulations some quantitative assumptions are applied:
R&D costs for the creation of a new product are a fraction of total income
(f) of 2%; the competitive market price for each good (Pcomp) is equal to
zero (0), therefore prices of goods tend to zero in the long term; at the first
period of simulation there are 3 goods with different prices and technological
levels, and; the simulation runs for 100 periods of time.
The key parameters of the analyses performed are k, qp, C and Ns, re-
spectively accounting for income inequality, maximum fraction of income
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spent in positional consumption, size of the consumer population and size
of the consumer social neighborhood respectively. Tha values of R&D costs
(f) and consumption frequency are also varied in some subscenarios. Table
1 describes the set of scenarios tested.
4.2 Baseline simulation - modelling positional compe-
tition and technological innovation
In the baseline simulation, the model takes an inequality coefficient (k) of 2 -
a value similar to those found in typical societies4 - , a maximum fraction of
consumer income potentially expendable in the positional functionality (qp)
of 0.5 - half the consumers’ income - , a population (C) of 100 consumers
with all consumers influencing each other - i.e. with a social neighborhood
size (Ns) of 99 - and R&D costs being a fraction of total income (f) of 2%.
Figure 4: Number of goods over time
The results reveal a cyclical creation of new and technologically more
developed goods driven by competition for positional goods. In the first pe-
riods of the simulation the consumers make their choices, according to their
4A k of 2 is equivalent to a Gini index of 0.251 or a Hoover index of 0.219
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Figure 5: Matching between consumers and goods, at the end of simulation
(t = 100)
preferences, amongst the goods available in the market. After the matching
between consumer preferences and the available goods, a latent demand for
the consumption of a more technologically advanced good eventually surges
and grows. As soon as the expected revenues for the industry for putting a
more technologically advanced good into the market exceed the R&D costs
necessary for its development, the good is actually developed and the latent
demand is satisfied. The matching between consumers and goods is renewed
at each period, a process which dynamically evolves both through the evolu-
tion of the positional attributes of the goods - which change each time any
consumer alters its choice - and the downtrend of prices of goods through
time due to increasing competition and the efficiency of production process.
Figure 4 shows the number of goods in each period of time. New goods
are created at a relatively stable rate, except in the warm-up time (up to
about the 20th period). At the end of the simulation, there are 30 goods in
total, i.e. 27 new goods are created at a cycle of new product development
being about 3,7 periods. Figure 5 shows the matching between consumers
and goods at the last period of simulation. Consumers at the high end of
income are consuming goods at the high end of sophistication, and consumers
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at the low end of income are consuming the less sophisticated goods. The
three initial goods have no longer any buyers. It is noteworthy that in this
last period the good with the highest number of consumers is good number
29, which was, when consumers made their decisions, the most sophisticated
one available. But as is possible to see in Figure 4, a new good is finally
created in this period (good number 30), which happens precisely as a result
of the fact that many consumers were already consuming the highest level
good, enabling a strong latent demand for a new good.
The main result of this dynamics of ”competition” for positional goods
together with a continuous price downtrend is a cyclical creation of more
technologically advanced goods.
4.3 Income inequality
As we have seen above, the degree of inequality depends on the value of k in
the Weibull curve that defines income distribution among the population of
consumers. To check for effects of inequality over the level of innovation in
the model, simulations were run with different values of k. The Figure below
shows the results obtained. It also shows the Hoover index - a measure of
(in)equality - for the spectrum of tested k values. The higher is the Hoover
index - and k - the most equitative is the defined income distribution.
The general trend observed is that the dynamics of technological inno-
vation improves with equality, although this trend is broken for values of k
sensibly between 2 and 3. This result holds for different values of R&D costs
(f), as is seen in Figure 6.
The relation between the pace of innovation and level of equality depends
on two opposing drivers. In an unequal society, high-end consumers are will-
ing to individually spend very large amounts of money to obtain positional
utility, but there are not many consumers in that position. In a fairly equal
society, high-end consumers do not have, in relative terms, so much funds,
but there is a much larger pool of consumers with incomes very close to
the highest earnings level. In this situation, despite the fact that high-end
consumers are not willing to spend as high as in the unequal society, they
together have a powerful multiplying effect. It is the balance between these
two variants - price of the new good and number of consumers willing to
pay for it - that determines wether technological innovation increases or de-
creases with the level of equality. In our model, the massification of high-end
19
Figure 6: Number of new goods with different income distributions
consumption is, in the large majority of the income distribution setups, a
stronger driver of technological innovation than the relative wealth of the
richest consumers.
Back to the argument of Kashdan and Klein, inspired by Hayek, that in
the dynamics of a growing economy it is the wealthy that enable a market
for goods necessarily expensive for its supply to be viable, this result shows
that it is possible to have an even more viable market for new goods with
a lower price for those goods, as long as there is a larger pool of consumers
economically able to compete for the highest positional places (i.e. a less
unequal society).
On the other hand, at first thought the result of our model may seem not
to support the conjecture put forward by Frank (2003) and Frank and Levine
(2005) that inequality drives positional expenditure cascades. However, their
argument is grounded on the observation that the savings rate of middle class
has been decreasing with the increase of inequality, whereas our model takes
income available for positional spending as a constant (qp) fraction of income.
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4.4 Hirsch Conjecture
According to Hirsch, ”social limits to growth” are imposed by the fact that
the relative importance of the positional economy over the material economy
increases with affluence growth. When basic material needs of consumers get
satisfied, they tend to increase their share of income to positional means 5.
We analyze consequences, on the dynamics of innovation, of the materi-
alization of the Hirsch conjecture. Model simulations with different shares of
consumption dedicated to positionality show decreasing returns of innovation
to the share of allocatable income to positional spending. This would imply
that ”social limits to growth” would apply also to the ”innovation factor” of
positional consumption.
Figure 7: Number of new goods as a function of the share of consumer income
available to positional spending
However, this result of decreasing returns of innovation to positional con-
sumption is subject to the assumption of the model that consumers exert
5Brekke et al (1998) note although that this may not be true, depending on the speci-
fication of the utility function of consumers).
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their positional stakes (by consuming) at a constant rate (one good is bought
at each period; its utility is valid for one period). It is plausible to expect
positional stakes to be played more frequently as the budget available for po-
sitional consumption also increases. On this, the model shows that different
frequencies of consumption may return different volumes of innovation; com-
paring the initially assumed consumption frequency of 1 with a consumption
frequency of 2 (two goods consumed in each period) results show that (Figure
7) that the lower frequency returns more innovation for low levels of relative
budget allocatable to positional spending whereas the higher consumption
frequency returns more innovation for high levels of positional budget. This
suggests that, if the increment of positional spending carries with it an in-
crease in consumption frequency, then the result of decreasing returns of
innovation to positional spending would not necessarily occur. The nature of
the relation between positional spending and innovation therefore depends
also on the the relation between positional spending and the frequency of
positional consumption. In this respect, we remark nevertheless that the in-
crease of frequency of positional consumption must have its own limits, posed
by the finite pace at which consumers are able to incorporate information on
changes in the ”positional market”. Only when consumers actually realize
changes in their positional ranking and available positional goods can they
form and deliver their consumption decisions.
4.5 Consumer network
The positional competition for goods occurs within its own societal context.
When one individual evaluates his position or that of other individuals in
the social ranking, he does so within his perceived social sphere, i.e. within
the group of individuals with whom he regards as belonging to his group of
influence.
On one hand, one may discuss whether this social arena for positional
competition is regarded by individuals as a large group of other individuals,
like a region or a country, or on the contrary as a very small circle of close
connections in the individual’s particular social context, like family and clos-
est acquaintances. In this scope context it is interesting to test for the level
of innovation occurring before different sizes of the social population (still
assuming a fully connected influence neighborhood) are tried.
The model produces very stable results (Figure 8) before variations in
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Figure 8: Number of new goods as a function of number of consumers
population size, except for very low sizes of the social network (less than 10
agents) where the number of goods produced can vary no more than 25%
of the commontypical innovation output. Therefore, the size of the relevant
social network for positionality shows no relevant effects on the speed of
innovation, unless very small networks are considered.
On the other hand, we may question the importance of the nature and size
of the influence group affecting each consumer’s choices (named above as the
consumer neighborhood). We admitted a consumer neighborhood defined
by proximity in social class (or level of income); a consumer is influenced
- in his evaluation of the utilities given by different goods - by his closest
neighbors in the social ranking. This accounts for a world where people
compare themselves to friends, work colleagues and residential neighbors,
i.e. people who tend to belong to a similar income group.
Translating this question to the real world, the relevant focus would be
less on the proportion and quantity of consumers within the whole popula-
tion accounting for one’s neighborhood, but rather on the extension of one’s
influence group to social classes different than its own. In the example above,
a neighborhood consisting of all the consumers in the network would trans-
late into a society where an individual would be influenced indifferently by
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any other individuals, disregard of their social class. Such was the case in the
simulations presented above. On the other hand, a small neighborhood in
our model is analogous to a world where individuals compare their positional
achievements with other individuals with a very similar social class.
Figure 9: Number of new goods as a function of size of social neighborhood,
with different investment costs of R&D
Taking the baseline population of 100 consumers, we simulated different
neighborhood sizes to account for its effects on the creation of new goods.
In the first set of simulations, different levels of R&D investment costs were
tried (f). The baseline value for inequality was taken (k=2).
The simulated results for this inequality scenario have shown a perfectly
stable amount of new goods for neighborhood sizes up to about 60% of the
total number of consumers, whereas higher neighborhood sizes produced in-
creasing levels of innovation. The result is robust for different levels of re-
quired investment on R&D, as shown in Figure 9. Although the explanation
for this outcome is not straightforward, we know that ultimately the creation
of new goods depends on the aggregate willingness to pay of the high end
consumers. Apparently, the willingness to pay of the group with the highest
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potential revenue for the industry is affected by the size of the social neigh-
borhood only with neighborhood sizes relatively close to the total number of
consumers, case in which the potential income tends to increase.
However, this particular result, which assumes a given inequality profile
(k=2), is not generalizable. In fact, testing neighborhood sizes with other
inequality profiles produces quite distinct results. As we can see in Figure
10, not only the partial non-dependence between neighborhood size and in-
novation does not occur for other income distributions, but also the direction
of the observed relation varies largely with income distribution and differen-
tially with neighborhood size. A high equality level (k=3) results in a null
relation, for the number of new goods produced is invariable. On the other
hand, a society with a high inequality (k=0.5) produces results with disparate
differential relations between neighborhood size and level of innovation.
Figure 10: Number of new goods as a function of size of social neighborhood,
with different income distributions
The relation between types of networks of social interaction and the gen-
eration of innovation is complex, and depends highly on the income distribu-
tion. It seems not to be possible to clearly infer a profile for this relation in
25
the real world, which is likely to vary largely from place to place depending
on the structure of society.
Figure 11: Summary of results
The table in Figure 11 summarizes the main findings provided by the
results of the simulations presented above.
5 Summary and Conclusions
With the aim of contributing to the comprehension of the relation between
positional consumption and technological innovation of products, we devel-
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oped a model that represents the process of technological development gen-
erated by the competition for consumption of positional goods.
In this model, the positional utility of goods is connected to their tech-
nological attributes and consumers periodically play their stakes in the posi-
tional game by consuming one type of good. There are different versions of
the type of good which differ in their technological level. New, more techno-
logical advanced, versions of the good are developed and put into the market
by the industry whenever the expected revenues of sales are higher than the
costs of R&D for developing the more technologically advanced version. Si-
multaneously, prices of new goods decrease with time due to increasing com-
petition and productive efficiency. Periodically the consumers evaluate the
expected positional utility achieved from each version of the good against
their available budgets and correspondingly place their decisions on which
one to buy.
This process of competition for positional goods associated with the pos-
sibility of creation of new goods and their progressive price decrease generates
a cyclical development of technologically more developed goods. The pace
of innovation depends on several model parameters, namely the number of
consumers, the amount of R&D costs for the creation of new goods, the pace
of decrease of prices, income inequality, the relative preferences of consumers
for positional goods over other types of spending and the type of influence
network of the consumers. We tested for the effects of variations of some
of these parameters over the pace of innovation, namely income inequality,
the materialization of the Hirsch conjecture and the size of the population of
consumers and the size of the social neighborhood of positional influence.
Before different levels of income inequality, the model globally produces
a negative relation between income inequality and the number of new goods
created, although with oscillations in this rule accross the possible spectrum
of income distribution profiles. This result has shown that, contrary to a
conventional argument, the market for innovation may happen to be higher
in less unequal societies.
To check the consequences of the Hirsch conjecture on innovation, testing
different shares of positional spending showed decreasing returns of inno-
vation to positional spending. This would imply that the ”social limits to
growth” imposed by increasing positional spending would also apply to the
associated process of technological innovation, although this result depends
on the assumption that the frequency of consumption is rigid. Although fre-
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quency of consumption is likely to increase with wealth, we note that it must
also have its own limits, if not for other reasons at least due to restrictions
in the ability of positional consumers to obtain information on the positional
market.
Finally, the relation between the social neighborhood size of positional
influence and the generation of innovation was seen as a complex one, highly
dependent on income distribution. According to the results of the model,
the profile of this relation in the real world varies largely from place to place,
depending on the structure of society.
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